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Learning by Doing: Trade Unions and Electoral Politics in Batam, 
Indonesia, 2004-2009 
Michele Ford  
Abstract 
Academic studies of local politics in post-Suharto Indonesia focus on the emergence of 
coalitions between parties and candidates, arguing that the entrenched and dominant role of 
political elites has effectively excluded non-elite interests from the electoral arena. The question, 
then, given the very real and serious obstacles to popular participation, is: what possibility is 
there for non-elite actors to engage in a meaningful way in electoral politics? One example of an 
attempt at such engagement can be found in the industrial city of Batam, where the local branch 
of the Federation of Indonesian Metalworkers Unions set up a purpose-specific structure to 
promote the political interests of its members in successive local executive and legislative 
elections. This paper argues that, despite the ultimate failure of the union’s electoral experiments 
between 2004 and 2009, the process of ‘learning by doing’ embedded in them presents a 
significant challenge to analyses that discount the possibility of substantive popular participation 
in electoral politics.  
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Academic studies of Indonesian local politics following decentralization have focused on the 
entrenched and dominant role of political elites and the decisive role of money politics. As 
Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, p 15) point out, this body of work emphasizes the self-reinforcing 
nature of the multilayered chokehold over Indonesia’s political system by the wealthy. Scholars 
argue that local and provincial elections are dominated by existing power brokers, including New 
Order-era bureaucrats, business players and criminal elements (Bünte, 2008; Robison and Hadiz, 
2004; Hadiz, 2010; Sidel, 2004; Vel, 2005), who maintain power through ‘backroom deals and 
internal party horse-trading’ (Buehler, 2010, p 272). In some cases, voters have some capacity to 
leverage inter-elite fissures (Buehler, 2009), and occasionally unlikely candidates – such as the 
handful of highlanders who stood in the Papuan gubernatorial elections in 2006 (Chauvel, 2009, 
p 314) – emerge. But, ultimately, election outcomes continue to be determined largely by non-
democratic factors.  
A key reason cited for the emergence of such a pattern is the short-term, utilitarian nature of 
coalition-building between political parties and electoral candidates, resulting in alliances void of 
a shared political philosophy, policy agenda or values. 1 For example, in their account of 
elections in the district of Gowa in 2005, Buehler and Tan (2007, p 65) found that candidates had 
formed relationships with parties on an ‘ad hoc basis, often as a result of personal, not political, 
bonds and only shortly before the elections’, and that those relations often disintegrated soon 
after. Surprisingly, little reference is made to parties or their platforms in those candidates’ 
campaign materials. Buehler’s (2009) broader study of the role of political parties in 10 district 
head contests in South Sulawesi confirms that, although parties played a role as ‘gatekeepers’ in 
deciding who could contest elections, they had little influence over election outcomes, which 
instead depended on candidates’ personal networks. Similarly, Mietzner (2008, p 129) concludes 
that the relationship between parties and candidates in the gubernatorial elections in North 
Sulawesi was primarily determined by financial considerations and not by candidates’ ‘loyalty to 
the party, ideological affinity or commitment to carry out the party’s political agenda if elected’.2 
The representative function of political parties is an obvious casualty of this politics of 
convenience – a fact nowhere more evident than in parties’ failure to represent the interests of 
industrial labour (Hadiz, 2010, pp 144–152). In one of the very few analyses of labour’s role in 
local politics, Hadiz asserts that democratization has benefited working class organizations, but 
that the labour movement is ‘too weak and fragmented to be regarded as a significant enough 
social force for elites to seriously co-opt’, and thus continues to have no political influence. This 
assessment rings true for the first half a decade after the fall of Suharto, when there was little 
engagement between organized labour and political parties (Ford, 2005), and for areas where few 
people were employed in manufacturing or other formal-sector industrial occupations. However, 
it fails to acknowledge the substantial and repeated overtures made to prominent labour activists 
in the industrial heartlands of Java and Sumatra, which began shortly before the 2004 general 
election, or trade unions’ own electoral experiments since that time. 
Although many trade unionists have continued to reject the approaches of enterprising party 
officials, a significant number of labour activists did begin seriously to consider direct 
engagement in electoral politics from 2004 (Ford and Tjandra, 2007). Among this number were 
some who were driven primarily by opportunism, either for themselves or their organizations. 
                                                                    
1 See, for example, Buehler (2007), Carnegie (2009), Hadiz (2010); Mietzner (2008), Sulistiyanto (2009) and Ufen 
(2008). 
2 Mietzner argues that this phenomenon was fuelled by the fact that parties were impecunious following the 2004 
national elections 
Others had come to realize that local governments had the power to shape decisions about areas 
of policy that affected workers, and that in areas of industrial concentration, worker-citizens 
potentially had the power to shape local government. The political experiments that resulted 
from this dramatic change in trade unionists’ attitudes towards formal politics did not increase 
the number of worker-representatives in Indonesia’s local and national parliaments. But, in some 
cases at least, they succeeded in raising awareness of a labour constituency and creating space 
within formal politics for the discussion of that constituency’s sectoral interests. These were 
admittedly baby steps, but they demonstrated that organized labour had begun to take seriously 
its potential role as a champion of non-elite engagement in the political sphere. 
This article establishes the significance of trade union political campaigns through a close 
examination of the case of one particular union, the Federation of Indonesian Metalworkers 
Unions (FSPMI), in the industrial parks of Batam, an island on Indonesia’s border with 
Singapore and Malaysia.3 Drawing on data collected during intensive periods of fieldwork in 
Batam and Jakarta in May 2007, April 2010 and May 2012, building on a much longer period of 
studying organized labour, it describes and analyses the Metalworkers’ attempts to promote the 
interests of industrial labour in the electoral processes at different levels of government.4 The 
article argues that, while not particularly successful by any objective measure, the Metalworkers’ 
electoral experiments between 2004 and 2009 represented a significant step towards greater non-
elite participation in electoral politics and offered both encouragement and important lessons for 
other non-elite groups seeking to engage in the political sphere. 
Re-engaging with formal politics  
                                                                    
3 For an overview of Batam’s position in the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore growth triangle, see Peachey et al (1998) 
and Ford and Lyons (2006). 
4 More than 100 interviews were conducted with union leaders at the national, local and plant level, as well as several 
more with labour NGO activists, members of the Municipal Assembly who were sympathetic to labour and local 
manpower bureaucrats. Members of the Metalworkers Union interviewed included national president, Said Iqbal, and 
vice-president and key political strategist, Ridwan Monoarfa, as well as local activists. Representatives of the 
Confederation of All-Indonesia Workers Unions and its affiliates, the Metal, Electronics and Machine Workers Union, 
along with the Tourism Workers Union, were interviewed, as well as members of the National Workers Union; the 
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mining, Oil, Natural Gas and General Workers Unions; and the Federation of 
Independent Workers Unions. I also had the opportunity to attend a number of meetings and workshops of the 
Metalworkers Union in Batam and national meetings on trade union engagement in politics involving high-level 
representatives from several trade unions. This article was completed as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) 
Discovery Project entitled ‘The Re-emergence of Political Labour in Indonesia’ (DP120100654). Fieldwork was 
conducted in 2007 as part of a joint project with Surya Tjandra (funded by AIGRP), in 2010 with funding by the 
University of Sydney’s Special Studies Program, and in 2012 with ARC funding. Thanks to Nicola Edwards for 
research assistance, to Robert Cribb for drawing the map of Batam’s electoral districts, and to Edward Aspinall and 
Teri Caraway for their comments on an earlier draft of the article 
Although organized labour has a long history of political engagement in Indonesia, the single 
state-sanctioned trade union allowed during Suharto’s New Order (1966–98) was strictly 
prohibited from developing links to political parties or becoming involved in electoral politics in 
other ways (Hadiz, 1997; Ford, 2009).5 With the exception of the Indonesian Centre for Labour 
Struggle, which was closely linked with the then-unregistered Democratic People’s Party, the 
‘alternative’ trade unions of the late New Order period also publicly rejected the possibility of 
ties with political parties, as did the labour non-governmental organizations which at that time 
largely drove the independent labour movement (Ford, 2009). 
Most trade unionists remained firmly opposed to political trade unionism in the early years after 
the fall of Suharto – indeed, as Törnquist (2004, p 392) has observed, ‘wage labourers, and many 
trade union activists too, [did] not see any relation between struggles in the workplace and those 
over politics’. Although fissures in the ‘no politics’ stance appeared as early as the 1999 General 
Election, when four of the 48 parties that participated claimed to represent the interests of labour 
(Ford, 2005), labour’s long structural isolation from politics was only seriously challenged after 
2004, when branches of major political parties began courting local labour figures as candidates 
and as vote-winners. In addition to wooing large trade unions, local party functionaries 
approached labour NGO activists and high-profile members of smaller NGO-sponsored unions 
to run as candidates in the industrial centres of Greater Jakarta, East and West Java, North 
Sumatra and Batam (Ford and Tjandra, 2007). Then in the lead-up to 2009, party approaches 
extended to the national level with the central executives of a number of parties wooing the 
central executives of major unions in an attempt to establish ‘political contracts’ under which 
union candidates were run in exchange for members’ votes. This phenomenon was spearheaded 
by the Prosperous Justice Party, which established a labour NGO called the Indonesian Labour 
Foundation for this purpose. However, many other parties also approached trade unions, 
including large established parties such as the Golkar Party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle, the United Development Party and the National Awakening Party, but also smaller or 
newer parties, such as the Christian Peace and Welfare Party, Gerindra and Hanura. 
Some larger trade unions actively campaigned against these advances. Others ignored them at an 
institutional level while allowing individual members to run, in some cases requiring union 
office-bearers to resign from their substantive posts before doing so. Others still responded 
proactively as institutions to party pressure. One strategy, adopted by the National Workers 
Union, revolved around national-level deal-making but very little direct institutional involvement 
at the grass roots. A second approach, adopted by unions affiliated with the Confederation of 
                                                                    
5 The extent to which trade unions engage in the political arena or have ties to political parties varies greatly from 
country to country and across different periods of history. Trade unions were historically extremely influential in the 
political systems of many European countries, the legacies of which were transferred to many of their colonial 
possessions and reflected in the contemporary politics in Australia, India and much of Latin America. Indonesia’s 
strong tradition of politically engaged trade unions was disrupted by the anti-Leftist purges of 1965–66. For details of 
the Indonesian case, see Hadiz (1997) and Ford (2009). 
All-Indonesia Workers Unions (the legacy union of the Suharto period), was to engage locally 
but not nationally. The Metalworkers, by contrast, responded at both levels, with the central 
executive striking deals with different parties in different locations, at the same time as local 
branches maintained considerable independence with regard to political strategy. Most strikingly, 
in the case of the Batam branch, the decision was made to establish Jas Metal (an acronym that 
literally means the Metalworkers’ Network of Knots) as a structurally independent organization 
with an exclusively political mandate. 
The Metalworkers and Jas Metal  
Established in 1999 by former members of the Suharto-era Metal, Electronics and Machine 
Workers Union, the Metalworkers Union is one of 91 trade union federations registered at the 
national level in Indonesia.6 Official government records show that in 2005 the Metalworkers 
had over 82,000 members in eight provinces (Departemen Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi, 
unpublished document, 2005). Four years later, this total had reached a little over 116,000 
members, some 18,525 of whom were based in Batam. The vast majority of members belong to 
the federation’s two largest member unions – the Electrical and Electronics Workers Union and 
the Automotive, Machine & Components Workers Union. The Metalworkers has been a leading 
force in the Congress of Indonesian Trade Unions, the second-generation breakaway from the 
official union federation of the Suharto period to which most internationally affiliated unions 
belong.7 It is also affiliated to the International Metalworkers Federation, which helped facilitate 
its establishment and is one of several international trade union donors from which the 
Metalworkers Union now receives support.8 
The Metalworkers Union is in some ways a typical ‘mainstream’ union of the post-Suharto 
period, as it is primarily concerned with developing effective workplace bargaining procedures 
and consolidating its industrial presence. In other ways, however, it is defiantly atypical. The 
federation quickly developed financial independence after it adopted a centralized dues structure 
very different from the branch-dependent structure commonly used by Indonesian unions. This 
approach has enabled the central executive to take a proactive role, both on the national stage 
and in consolidating internal union matters through measures such as funding full-time regional 
advocacy and legal officers responsible directly to the federation. As a result, the Metalworkers 
                                                                    
6 According to the most recent comprehensive survey by the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, in 2005 there 
were just over 3.4 million trade unionists and some 11,852 company-level unions in Indonesia (Departemen Tenaga 
Kerja dan Transmigrasi, unpublished document, 2005). 
7 For an overview of the labour movement in the post-Suharto period, see Ford (2009, pp 153– 180). For a discussion 
of the role of legacy trade unions, see Caraway (2008). 
8 For an account of FSPMI’s internationally funded gender programmes, see Ford (2008). Note that in 2012 the 
International Metalworkers Federation amalgamated with Global Union Federations responsible for other kinds of 
manufacturing to form a new Global Union Federation called IndustriALL. 
stands out administratively as one of a very few Indonesian unions capable of systematic, regular 
collection and processing of membership data. The sidelining of hierarchically nested branch 
structures created direct lines of responsibility and communication from the central to the local 
levels within member unions. When combined with specialized and relatively intensive service 
provision, this structure has enabled the federation’s central leadership to work intensively with 
union officials and members at the company level to create a sense of belonging in the union, 
which in turn has enhanced the federation’s industrial power. 
The Metalworkers has also taken the lead among unions in the political arena. Initially, like the 
central executives of most other mainstream unions, its leaders took a firm stance against 
institutional involvement in politics.9 This position shifted in response to a series of regional 
revolts against its no-politics policy. Although the Batam branch was not the only branch to 
experiment politically at the local level after the 2004 elections, its response offered by far the 
most explicit challenge to the ban on institutional engagement in politics, prompting significant 
debate at the national level about the federation’s approach to politics. 
In order to get around national policy, activists within the branch established Jas Metal, an ‘ad 
hoc structure’ designed to function as ‘a medium for the channelling of the political aspirations 
of Metalworkers members in the context of the legislative elections … to vet prospective 
candidates, to mediate political interests, to facilitate the placement of those prospective 
candidates, [and] monitor and supervise their progress’ (FSPMI Kepri, 2008). Political 
engagement, Jas Metal’s founders argued, is a natural activity for trade unions that cannot be 
divorced from workers’ democratic struggle for their rights. Logically, then, trade unions must 
not only participate in and seek to influence discussions of public policy, but also recognize and 
harness the electoral power of their membership (Jas Metal, 2009, p 3). 
The Metalworkers was by no means the only union in Batam to work with political parties 
during this period; nor was Jas Metal the sole conduit for the Metalworkers’ participation in the 
political arena. However, the existence of Jas Metal makes the case study of the union’s Batam 
branch a particularly salient one with regard to the question of non-elite engagement in electoral 
politics. 
Local engagement, 2004–2006  
As in other industrial centres, trade unionists in Batam first became interested in engaging 
politically when approached by parties anxious to access the voting blocs they believed trade 
unions represented. Of the 240,509 Indonesian citizens employed in Batam City in 2007, 
                                                                    
9 Many of the smaller unions, particularly those that had grown with the support of the student left, were in principle 
much more open to political engagement. However, with the exception of the National Front for Indonesian Workers’ 
Struggle, none was big enough to attract the interest of established political parties or had the resources to mount its 
own sustained political campaign. 
164,476 people (65% of whom were female) worked in secondary industries (BPS Kota Batam, 
2009, p 78). This unusually high concentration of blue-collar formal sector workers made Batam 
an obvious target for party strategists thinking about the labour vote. 
In the 2004 national legislative election, the Social Democratic Labour Party, led by Muchtar 
Pakpahan, the labour lawyer who had established the strongest of the alternative trade unions of 
the late Suharto period – the only one of the 24 parties listed on the ballot paper to claim to 
represent labour – received well over twice its national average, at 1.4% of the vote in Batam 
City (BPS Kota Batam, 2009, pp 35–40).10 In the municipal assembly elections of 2004, the 
party received 2.5% of votes cast, which, while still tiny, was sufficient to secure one seat in the 
local assembly. Although there was little support for the Social Democratic Labour Party 
amongst unionists,11 the Metalworkers and other unions worked closely with the elected labour 
representative, Karles Sinaga, and with other sympathetic members of the municipal assembly, 
including the Peace and Welfare Party member Rudy Sembiring, a pastor in the Batak Lutheran 
Church, and National Mandate Party member Setyasih Prihelina on a number of labour issues. 
The election of Karles and unions’ subsequent engagement with elected politicians prompted 
discussion amongst unionists and political parties regarding the electoral potential of the labour 
vote. It was obvious to all concerned that, in a region so dominated by industrial workers, labour 
was a constituency that could have a defining impact on the outcome of local (but also national) 
elections.  
The first subnational election to occur in Batam after 2004 was the Gubernatorial Election of 30 
June 2005, which was also the first such election in the history of the newly formed Kepri 
province. The central government had appointed Ismeth Abdullah, the former head of the Batam 
Industrial Development Authority, as Governor in 2004 when the 2002 decree on the formation 
of the new province came into effect.12 He and running mate Muhammad Sani represented the 
Golkar Party and the Prosperous Justice Party, with the support of several other parties including 
the United Development Party and the Democrat Party. A second pairing, consisting of Rizal 
Zen and Firman Bisowarno, was nominated by the National Awakening Party. The third pairing, 
Nyat Kadir and Soerya Respationo, was nominated by the National Mandate Party and the 
                                                                    
10 In the 1999 General Election, four of the 48 parties that participated claimed to represent the interests of labour. A 
fifth registered with the Department of Justice and Human Rights, although it did not contest the election. The Leftist 
People’s Democratic Party also ran in 1999. For more details, see Ford (2005). 
11 In Batam, as elsewhere, most politically oriented trade unionists were unwilling to support PBSD because of its 
close links to the Confederation of Indonesian Prosperous Labour Unions and the ethnic and religious dominance of 
Christian Batak in both organizations (Interviews, Batam, 2010). In interviews conducted in 2007 in Batam, Surabaya 
and Medan, members of the confederation also identified this as a barrier to wider support. 
12 For background on the formation of Kepri province, see Ford (2003). 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle.13 Prominent trade unionists lined up behind each of the 
teams. The Confederation of All-Indonesia Workers Unions, the most experienced political 
operator in the labour movement at that time, pledged the support of its membership to Ismeth’s 
team in return for a building in which to house its secretariat, which it was subsequently given 
(Interview with Secretary of the KSPSI Batam Branch, 15 April 2010). 
As part of this broader process of lobbying trade unions, the political parties supporting each 
team began working through party members with connections to the Metalworkers to seek the 
support of individuals within the union elite. As a result, different politically active members 
within the ranks of the union gave their support to all three nominees, an outcome that prompted 
deep reflection after the election, leading to the decision that it was necessary to present a united 
front in their efforts to influence formal politics. At the same time, however, the union’s national 
president, Thamrin Mossi, had made it very clear that he disapproved of such politicking, telling 
local activists that it was the central executive’s decision whether or not the union would engage 
politically. In response, local activist-members sought a way to participate in electoral politics 
that would not openly defy these instructions. Their solution was Jas Metal, established in 
November 2005 with the express purpose of promoting the political interests of the union in the 
Batam mayoral election scheduled for February 2006. 
The first public event hosted by newly formed Jas Metal was a panel discussion to which all 
mayoral candidates and their running mates were invited to discuss their position on labour 
issues. Four party coalitions had nominated mayoral teams. The first of these was nominated by 
the National Mandate Party and the Democrat Party; the second by the National Awakening 
Party and the Peace and Welfare Party. The third team had the support of the Golkar Party, the 
Prosperous Justice Party, the United Development Party, and the United Democratic Nationhood 
Party. The fourth was nominated by three Sukarnoist parties – the Indonesian Democratic Party 
of Struggle, the Marhaenist Indonesian Nationalist Party, the Vanguard Party – in conjunction 
with the New Indonesia Alliance Party and the Social Democratic Labour Party.14 Three of the 
teams attended the Jas Metal forum. After consulting with plant-level union executives, Jas 
Metal then engaged in further discussions with candidates and, ultimately, a political contract 
was signed with Ahmad Dahlan and Ria Saptarika, the team supported by the Golkar Party and 
the Prosperous Justice Party.15 Jas Metal then made the contract public, and used its cell structure 
to mobilize grass-roots support from within the membership of the Metalworkers. 
                                                                    
13 A number of small parties also supported the second and third pairs. For a detailed discussion of the 2005 
gubernatorial election, including a description of the candidates, see Choi (2007b, pp 334–336). 
14 For a detailed discussion of the 2006 mayoral election, see Choi (2007a). 
15 As part of this deal, Jas Metal was promised a building, which never materialized. 
Ahmad Dahlan and Ria Saptarika went on to receive 41.4% of the primary vote. Activists 
estimated that only 20–30% of Metalworkers members followed their directive, a figure that 
satisfied neither Jas Metal nor the mayoral candidates.16 Even so, they were encouraged by this 
outcome, which they felt had given them preferential access to the winning pair once in office, 
allowing them to lobby for local policies that better served the interests of industrial workers in 
the workplace, but also in the broader community. Emboldened by these early experiments, 
activists within Jas Metal began to imagine the possibilities not only of deepening their 
relationships with political elites, but of Metalworkers members themselves running for office. 
Ahmad Dahlan and Ria Saptarika went on to receive 41.4% of the primary vote. Activists 
estimated that only 20–30% of Metalworkers members followed their directive, a figure that 
satisfied neither Jas Metal nor the mayoral candidates.16 Even so, they were encouraged by this 
outcome, which they felt had given them preferential access to the winning pair once in office, 
allowing them to lobby for local policies that better served the interests of industrial workers in 
the workplace, but also in the broader community. Emboldened by these early experiments, 
activists within Jas Metal began to imagine the possibilities not only of deepening their 
relationships with political elites, but of Metalworkers members themselves running for office. 
Jockeying in the lead-up to 2009  
When Jas Metal activists turned their attention to the 2009 national legislative elections, it was 
immediately evident to them that they would require a very different approach. In the earlier 
local and provincial elections, candidates drawn from the party elites looked to trade unions in 
the hope that they could deliver a voting bloc, and Jas Metal’s role was limited to evaluating 
party proposals and then mobilizing support, much as described in the literature on elections in 
post-Suharto Indonesia. By contrast, the legislative elections presented an opportunity for grass-
roots trade unionists – the archetypical non-elite political actor – to run for election themselves 
on multi-candidate party tickets. 
By early 2007, initial overtures had been made by and to a number of parties. Work with plant-
level union officials also intensified, although activists remained unclear about precisely how the 
Metalworkers would approach the electoral campaign. In the meantime, the central executive’s 
attitude towards formal politics had shifted significantly when federation President Thamrin 
Mossi was replaced by Said Iqbal in November 2006. Soon after the new national executive was 
elected, Vice-President Ridwan Monoarfa, who also headed the Metalworkers’ largest affiliate, 
the Electrical and Electronics Workers Union (which in 2010 accounted for 16,484 of the 
                                                                    
16 In part, this problem was a consequence of low worker participation in the poll. Choi (2007a, p 337) found that the 
turnout in the main industrial estate of Muka Kuning, at around 28%, was much lower than in other areas of Batam, 
which was, in turn, much lower than other areas in the province. 
federation’s 18,525 members in Batam) began working closely with local activists to formulate a 
political strategy for 2009.17 
For several months, heated debates raged within the local union elite regarding the pros and cons 
of various possible political alliances. A number of key activists had a strong preference for an 
exclusive deal with the Prosperous Justice Party, which had wide appeal among labour activists 
in Batam more generally because of the party’s active involvement in labour issues. Some 
Metalworkers members were formally aligned with the party. A much broader group was 
attracted by its focus on policy and intensive mode of grass-roots engagement, which closely 
mirrored the approach that had been so successful within the union itself. In addition to 
negotiations with the union elite, party activists were already actively recruiting the grass-roots 
members through mosques on the industrial estates. As one trade union activist observed, the 
Prosperous Justice Party ‘started early because it really wants to prepare its cadres from the 
beginning – after all, it prides itself on being a cadre party’. In addition to the Metalworkers, the 
party had strong links with a number of other unions, but particularly with the Reformed 
Pharmaceutical and Health Workers Union. Its head, Suriadji, who was at the time also the local 
Congress of Indonesian Trade Unions representative, was a card-carrying member of the 
Prosperous Justice Party with close links to the Batam branch of the party’s labour NGO, the 
Indonesian Labor Foundation. He later ran as a candidate for the party in the 2009 election for 
the provincial assembly. 
Among the Metalworkers, the push to work exclusively with the Prosperous Justice Party was 
opposed by another group within the local union elite, with encouragement and support from 
Ridwan. This group strongly resisted the alliance on the grounds that an alliance with a single 
party would not only alienate members whose political loyalties lay elsewhere, but would expose 
the Metalworkers to accusations that it had been co-opted. Although Ridwan’s frequent and 
intensive engagement with Metalworkers activists in Batam and his position as head of the 
Electrical and Electronics Workers Union meant that his opinion carried considerable weight, the 
question of political alliance remained unresolved when on 5 May 2008 Jas Metal was 
reconvened to elect a new committee and begin planning in earnest for the elections in 2009. 
Jas Metal’s aims for the 2009 electoral cycle were deceptively simple: to recruit its best known 
members to run as candidates and to ensure that they were elected.18 In order to achieve these 
objectives, the committee identified a number of steps: to map the concentrations of workers 
domiciled in Batam; to negotiate with political parties for places on party tickets for 
Metalworkers candidates; to campaign amongst the membership for support; and (somewhat 
                                                                    
17 Ridwan’s intensive engagement with the Batam branch of the Metalworkers coincided with a project by the 
Solidarity Center in the region, which encouraged union members to engage with issues of public policy such as 
monitoring local government budgets. 
18 See FSPMI Kepri, 2008. 
optimistically) to supervise successful candidates once they took their seats in parliament (Jas 
Metal, 2009). By 3 June, a dozen local unionists had put their names forward as potential 
candidates. As a result of its constitution, which deemed that committee members (the director, 
adviser, steering committee and organizing committee – in total 20 people above the enterprise 
level within the structure of the Metalworkers) could not themselves run for election, none of 
those nominated held a formal position within Jas Metal. This conscious decision to separate 
candidates from Jas Metal officeholders sent a clear message that its purpose was to promote the 
political interests of its constituency and not self-interest. 
On 4 June, a formal communication was released containing 10 names. Nine of those had 
appeared on the original list. The tenth name was that of the new union president, Said Iqbal. 
Ultimately, nine candidates were accommodated, including Iqbal, who was allocated the number 
two position on the Prosperous Justice Party’s Kepri ticket for the national legislative assembly. 
Of the local Jas Metal candidates, two ran in the Batam electorate for the provincial parliament, 
one for the United Development Party and one for the Peace and Welfare Party. The remaining 
six entered the race for the Batam Municipal Assembly (see Figure 1). Four of the Metalworkers 
candidates in the municipal assembly race ran on the United Development Party ticket. The fifth 
ran for the Golkar Party and the sixth for the National Mandate Party. A number of other 
Metalworkers members ran independently of Jas Metal in the provincial and municipal races. In 
total, 10 candidates from the Metalworkers ran in three of Batam’s four electoral districts, two 
each in Districts 2 and 3 and six in District 4. In addition, Jas Metal gained the support of Hardi 
Selamat Hood, who ran for the Regional Representative Council (Jas Metal, 2009, p 5). 
At the same time that Jas Metal was developing its strategy, the Metalworkers’ central executive 
in far-off Jakarta was busy making its own arrangements for Batam. Having decided that it 
needed actively to manage local involvement in the 2009 elections, the central executive 
conducted a survey of the political potential of the regions that had expressed interest in 
engaging politically in an attempt to identify likely partners. It then made representations to the 
leaders of a number of parties at the provincial and national levels. As Jas Metal was 
approaching the local branches of the United Development Party, the Peace and Welfare Party, 
Golkar, the National Mandate Party and the Prosperous Justice Party to discuss the possibility of 
political contracts mandating candidate support for worker issues and trade union candidate 
placement on party tickets, Iqbal – who describes himself as being sympathetic to the Prosperous 
Justice Party but not a party cadre – was engaged in discussions at the national level to broker a 
deal. In addition to his own position as number two candidate for the party on the Kepri ballot 
for the national House of Representatives, under the agreement several Metalworkers candidates 
were to stand for the party in the provincial and local assembly elections. 
According to Iqbal, national leaders in the Prosperous Justice Party had agreed during the course 
of these negotiations that the trade union would decide who would represent it on the ticket. But 
when Jas Metal activists approached local party leaders, they were told that the party would 
choose which Metalworkers candidates would be accommodated. Without consulting Jakarta, Jas 
Metal terminated discussions with the Prosperous Justice Party and struck a deal with the United 
Development Party. Angry at the insurrection, Iqbal distanced himself from Jas Metal in Batam 
and issued a formal instruction reinforcing the structural separation between the Metalworkers 
and Jas Metal, and explicitly banning the use of the union’s symbols in its campaign. 
 
 
Figure 1. Electoral Districts in the Batam Municipality 
A period of considerable tension ensued, but the conflict was ultimately quarantined within the 
trade union elite and a compromise was eventually reached – a fact of great significance, given 
the propensity of unions, like other Indonesian organizations, to split at the first sign of conflict. 
For its part, Jas Metal agreed to promote all Metalworkers candidates regardless of their party 
affiliation or whether they had been nominated through Jas Metal. In return, Iqbal agreed not to 
interfere with the arrangements that Jas Metal had made locally. Jas Metal went on to sign a 
formal political contract with the United Development Party in January 2009, which specified 
the electoral district and position of the four Metalworkers members who were to run on the 
party ticket. Meanwhile, Iqbal offered to withdraw from his candidacy under pressure from other 
members of the central executive, who were increasingly concerned about the message sent to 
union members by the president’s decision to run as a Prosperous Justice Party candidate. 
However, after a period of internal negotiation, the Metalworkers’ central executive agreed that 
he could run. 
The protracted stalemate over strategy took a toll on Jas Metal, leaving it just three months to 
prepare its candidates and lobby the union membership to support them at the ballot box. In 
combination with political inexperience, this setback seriously undermined Jas Metal’s ability to 
mount an effective campaign, and therefore its capacity to deliver votes to the United 
Development Party. At the same time, however, the experience of confronting political and 
strategic differences within the union provided an important reality check for Jas Metal activists. 
This experience, along with major setbacks during the course of the campaign proper, very much 
challenged their resolve. 
The fallout  
The Metalworkers were among the most prominent labour actors in Batam, but other trade 
unions also campaigned during the lead-up to the 2009 polls. At the provincial level, a candidate 
from the Confederation of All-Indonesia Workers Unions, the legacy union of the Suharto era, 
ran for the Indonesian Employers and Workers Party and, as noted earlier, the local 
Pharmaceutical and Health Union chief stood as a candidate for the Prosperous Justice Party. 
These individuals were joined by three candidates from the Confederation of Indonesian 
Prosperous Workers Unions (the confederation that grew out of the alternative union established 
by Muchtar Pakpahan in the 1990s), two of whom ran for the Labour Party, the latest incarnation 
of the Social Democratic Labour Party, and a third for the National Mandate Party. The National 
Mandate Party candidate, Bambang Yulianto, who had previously been the head of the Labour 
Party and the regional coordinator of the Confederation of Indonesian Prosperous Labour 
Unions, had left both the party and the union as a result of internal conflict, but at the time of the 
election was still identified as a trade union candidate. At the district level, the Confederation of 
All-Indonesia Workers Unions fielded seven candidates for several parties. A fourth candidate 
from the Confederation of Indonesian Prosperous Labour Unions, representing the Labour Party, 
also participated in the district race (see Table 1). A number of other trade unionists ran without 
official support from their organizations. For example, although the National Workers Union did 
not formally engage in the election, two senior officials ran for the Concern for the Nation Party. 
Several questions emerge from an analysis of the overall performance of trade union candidates 
in the 2009 municipal assembly elections. Though still influential, by the time of the election, 
party ticket position was no longer decisive. However, at the time tickets were put together, 
ticket position was everything, as votes determined the number of candidates who made it into 
parliament from a particular party, but list order dictated who those candidates would be.  
 
 
Table 1. Trade Union Candidates in the Batam Municipal Assembly Election, 2009 
  
Name Union Political 
Party 
Ticket 
Position 
Rank in 
Party 
Candidate 
Votes 
Total Party 
Votes  
Electoral District 1 
Ismuntoro KSBSI P. Buruh 1 / 5 2 / 5 183 669 
Electoral District 2 
Wahyu Dianasari Jas Metal PPP 3 / 7 6 / 7 111 2,798 
Yudhi Asvianto FSPMI PPIB 4 / 12 4 / 12 86 2,918 
Imam Santoso KSPSI P. Demokrat 4/ 10 5 / 10 683 12,124 
Sukiryo KSPSI PKPI 2 / 10 3 / 10 311 2,843 
Electoral District 3 
  
Ery Istiawan Jas Metal PPP 4 / 7 5 / 7 215 6,471 
Ridel Manik FSPMI PRN 2 / 4 3 / 4 80 1,330 
Agus Suswanto KSPSI PPPI 2 / 3 1 / 3 59 172 
Sukarjo KSPSI PPIB 6 / 8 8 / 8 16 980 
Electoral District 4  
Agus Sriyono Jas Metal PPP 3 / 13 7 / 13 221 4,903 
Bambang Mulya Jas Metal PPP 5 / 13 6 / 13 231 4,903 
Agus Wibowo Jas Metal P. Golkar 9 / 12  6 / 12 214 5,225 
Bekti Purnama Jas Metal PAN 5 / 14 11 / 14 151 8,463 
Nikson Sitorus FSPMI P. Pelopor 2 / 10 2 / 10 299 995 
Sayuti FSPMI PMB 3 / 6 5 / 6 32 1,060 
Mulyono KSPSI PAN 6 / 14 10/14 333 8,463 
Syaiful Badri KSPSI PAN 12 / 14 14/14 112 8,463 
Setia P. Tarigan KSPSI PAN 13 / 14 8/14 228 8,463 
 
Note: Party acronyms used in this table are as follows, in the order that they first appear: Labour Party (P. Buruh); 
United Development Party (PPP); New Indonesia Alliance Party (PPIB); Democrat Party (P. Demokrat); Indonesian 
Justice and Unity Party (PKPI); Achipelagic Republic Party (PRN); Party of Indonesian Businesspeople and 
Workers (PPPI); Struggle for a New Indonesia Party (PPIB); Golkar Party (P. Golkar); National Mandate Party 
(PAN); Vanguard Party (P. Pelopor); Sun of the Nation Party (Partai Matahari Bangsa, PMB).  
Source: Raw data were drawn from local documents issued by the Electoral Commission. Information on trade 
union candidates was collected from internal trade union documents and interviews with representatives of the 
Federation of Indonesian Metalworkers Unions (FSPMI), the Confederation of All-Indonesian Workers Unions 
(KSPSI), the Confederation of All-Indonesia Prosperous Labour Unions (KSBSI), the National Workers Union 
(SPN), the Reformed Pharmaceutical and Health Workers Union (FSP FARKES Reformasi), the Labour Party and 
the Prosperous Justice Party, conducted in April 2010. 
 
As Table 1 suggests, although political parties sought out or agreed to accommodate trade union 
candidates, they were generally assigned mid- to low-ranking positions on party tickets, which at 
the time would have meant that they could deliver votes without having a serious chance of 
being elected. Even trade union candidates who were long-term party cadres were positioned 
well down the list. The shift to open party lists meant that individual candidates now needed, as 
individuals, to attract sufficient votes to be elected – a change that favoured worker candidates. 
Naturally enough, however, it also meant that parties shifted responsibility for (and the expense 
of) campaigning to the individual. As a consequence, in Batam, trade union candidates received 
little support from the parties and, even with the help of their unions or of Jas Metal, had little 
chance of competing against far wealthier and better connected candidates. 
The situation was quite different, however, in relation to Iqbal’s bid for a seat in the National 
Parliament, where the change in regulations regarding ticket position gave him a real chance at 
electoral success. In Iqbal’s case, the freeing up of party ticket order meant that there was a real 
possibility that he would out-poll the local party cadre who had been allocated first position on 
the Prosperous Justice Party ticket. This change brought a distinct shift in party attitudes towards 
his candidacy, particularly within Kepri itself.19 Iqbal was forced to rely on his union’s resources 
in Batam, but also on the island of Bintan, where the provincial capital is located. The lack of 
party support meant that he failed to make inroads on Kepri’s many other smaller islands, 
ultimately cheating him of victory. 
The second question that emerges concerns the strategy of running multiple candidates in single 
electoral districts. As Table 1 shows, this outcome did not simply reflect the different political 
stances of different trade unions, or even of Jas Metal and unaligned Metalworkers candidates. 
Nor was it just a means of accommodating the different political interests of trade union 
members and unaligned workers by running candidates on a variety of party tickets, as Jas Metal 
activists claimed. The fact that multiple candidates from the same trade unions ran for the same 
parties in District 4 suggests that it was also the result of a different kind of politics of 
accommodation – namely, the need to ensure that trade union activists who wished to run under 
the Jas Metal banner had a chance to do so, as well as a recognition that Jas Metal simply did not 
have the power to prevent unaligned Metalworkers members from running. As the data for 
District 4 show, multiple trade union candidacies resulted in a nine-way split of the 1,821 trade 
union votes. Although less dramatic, the results from Districts 2 and 3 demonstrate how the split 
trade union vote deprived a clear trade union front runner of valuable support, particularly in the 
open list environment. With fewer candidates, the trade union vote could have been much better 
targeted, even in the absence of better worker mobilization. 
                                                                    
19 The lack of support from local branch members can also be attributed in part to the incapacitation of Edi Zanur, the 
head of the party’s Department for Workers, Farmers and Fishers and founder of the Indonesian Labor Foundation. 
Zanur fell into a coma and lost his sight at a critical period in the campaign, and thus was unable to ‘socialize’ Iqbal’s 
candidacy among local party elites in Kepri (Interview by Caraway and Ford, Jakarta, 31 May 2012). 
Table 2. Jas Metal/Metalworkers Candidates in District 4 by Administrative Sub-District 
 
Name Union Party Bulang Galang S. Beduk Sagalang Total 
Agus Sriyono Jas Metal PPP 6 1 150 64 221 
Bambang Mulya Jas Metal PPP 1 4 97 129 231 
Agus Wibowo Jas Metal P. Golkar 7 3 78 126 214 
Bekti Purnama Jas Metal PAN 3 2 104 42 151 
Nikson Sitorus FSPMI P. Pelopor 1 1 105 192 299 
Sayuti FSPMI PMB 4 3 7 18 32 
Mulyono KSPSI PAN 6 3 193 131 333 
Syaiful Badri KSPSI PAN 7 4 40 61 112 
Setia P. Tarigan KSPSI PAN 7 14 87 120 228 
Total votes cast in sub-district (all parties) 4,491 6,466 29,759 48,229 88,945 
Votes cast for trade union candidates 42 35 861 883 1,821 
Votes cast for Jas Metal or FSPMI candidates 22 14 541 571 1,148 
Votes cast for Jas Metal candidates 17 10 429 361 817 
Votes for trade union candidates as % of 
overall vote 
0.94 0.54 2.89 1.83 2.05 
Votes for Metal or other FSPMI candidates as 
% of overall vote 
0.49 0.22 1.82 1.18 1.29 
Votes for Jas Metal as % of overall vote 0.38 0.15 1.44 0.75 0.92 
Jas Metal + FSPMI as % of votes for trade 
union candidates 
52.38 40.00 62.83 64.67 63.04 
Jas Metal as a % of votes for trade union 
candidates 
40.47 28.57 49.83 40.88 44.86 
 
Source: Raw data was taken from local documents issued by the Electoral Commission. 
 
A third related question regards overall coverage. The Metalworkers and the Confederation of 
All-Indonesia Workers Unions ran candidates in three of the four electoral districts, all three of 
which have a significant population of workers as a result of the spread of industrial activity on 
Batam. District 2 is home to the Kabil Industrial Estate on Batam’s east coast and District 3 to 
the industrial and shipbuilding district of Tanjung Uncang. The largest industrial estate, 
Batamindo Industrial Park, is located in Muka Kuning in District 4. In terms of party ranking, 
union candidates did quite well in Districts 2 and 3. However, the only district in which trade 
union candidates received over 2% of overall votes was District 4.20 As Table 2 shows, within 
that district, trade union votes in general, and Metalworkers votes in particular, were very much 
concentrated in Sei Beduk and Sagalang, the subdistricts containing and adjacent to the industrial 
park. 
Just as the running of multiple candidates in a single district diffused the concentration of votes, 
this multi-district strategy unnecessarily diffused trade union resources. If trade unions had been 
able to agree to campaign together but delegate responsibility for each of the three industrial 
districts to a single trade union, they could have maximized trade union candidates’ chances of 
being elected. For example, if the Metalworkers had focused on District 4, where it attracted over 
60% of trade union votes, it might have been able not only to gain many more votes in its 
industrial heartland, but also to improve its performance in the subdistricts of Bulang (which 
takes in the islands west and immediately south of Batam Island) and Galang (which is centred 
on the islands of Rempang and Galang to the southeast). Alternatively, given concerns about 
party affiliation and member choice, trade unions could have collaborated to run multi-party 
trade union tickets in each district involving a single candidate from each major trade union and 
promoted in joint campaigns. 
Ultimately, none of the trade union candidates was elected at the municipal level in the 2009 
election. Even the Labour Party failed to maintain the seat it had won in 2004, despite running a 
total of 21 candidates in the four electoral districts. And, in the end, the only Jas Metal candidate 
to be elected was Hardi Selamat Hood, who won a seat in the Regional Representative Council 
with 36,636 votes. Iqbal performed remarkably well in the national legislative election, falling 
just 3,974 votes short of the number received by the successful Prosperous Justice Party 
candidate, despite the lack of support from the local party structure and the fact that the 
electorate covered the whole of the Riau Archipelago, much of which is not industrialized.21 
Conclusion  
The Batam experience does not provide a basis on which to repudiate claims that Indonesian 
politics continues to be a game dominated by a powerful elite. Indeed, quite the opposite: as 
Iqbal’s experience in the national race suggests, even the brightest and best connected candidates 
the trade union movement has to offer continue to struggle against entrenched power structures 
in ways that echo the findings of studies of national and regional contests across Indonesia. 
However, the Batam case does challenge the more strident claims made about non-elite 
                                                                    
20 Trade union candidates attracted 1.45% of votes in District 2. The Labour Party’s union candidate in District 1 
received just 0.34% of votes, and candidates from the Metalworkers and the Confederation of All-Indonesia Workers 
Unions just 0.45% in District 3. 
21 Kepri’s three seats in the national parliament fell to candidates from Golkar, the Democrat Party and the Prosperous 
Justice Party, in that order. The Labour Party received 0.67% of valid votes cast, or well over double the percentage 
achieved nationally (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2009). 
disempowerment. Moreover, in determining that they would support union candidates but not 
themselves run, these non-elite actors moved beyond their personal interests in an attempt to 
develop an institutional base – a rare act in a political context famously dominated by 
personalized interests. 
Used to wielding considerable influence in their own domain, Jas Metal activists struggled 
bitterly with the realization not only that their authority meant little within the political pecking 
order, but also that workers’ willingness to follow trade union directives in the workplace did not 
automatically translate beyond it. As they openly admitted, their failure to mobilize the worker 
vote sufficiently in 2009 was as much a product of political naivety and lack of preparedness on 
their own part as of gatekeeping by political elites (Interviews with 2009 legislative candidates, 
Batam, April 2010), a fact that in itself challenges the strongest versions of the thesis of elite 
dominance. Importantly also, they demonstrated resilience. Upon failing in the 2009 legislative 
elections, they picked themselves up, dusted themselves off, and returned to the political 
battlefield armed with the knowledge they had gained through previous campaigns.22 And while 
Jas Metal activists underestimated the tightness of existing political circles and the level of grass-
roots mobilization required actually to generate a voting bloc, they did succeed in engaging 
political elites in public debates around worker issues and, in reaching agreements with a range 
of political parties, managed to do so without splitting the trade union. 
Given that political change is ultimately as much about process as about short-or even medium-
term outcomes, this willingness to ‘learn by doing’ is extremely significant not only for our 
understanding of the Indonesian labour movement, but also for broader analyses of 
contemporary Indonesian politics. It is not surprising that trade union activists had very little 
sense of how to mobilize the labour constituency or that the labour constituency proved so 
difficult to mobilize in a context where ordinary citizens were long told that they had no agency 
in the political sphere. Nor is it surprising that party elites are reluctant to embrace more fully a 
class of outsiders with nothing to contribute financially to the party. Given these factors, what is 
in fact surprising is that the Metalworkers and other unions developed any traction at all. 
It is important not to overstate the political influence of trade unionists on Batam’s political 
climate or, indeed, the extent to which the Batam experience was representative of trade unions’ 
level of political engagement in the country as a whole. At the same time, however, the Batam 
case as described here necessarily challenges accounts that seek to brush aside the potential to 
                                                                    
22 After just a few months, Jas Metal had regrouped and turned its attention to the 2010 gubernatorial elections, 
organizing a televised debate, complete with viewer polling, on labour issues. With the exception of Aida Ismeth, the 
wife of former governor Ismeth Abdullah (who was arrested in the February of that year on corruption charges), all 
candidates agreed to participate. Jas Metal subsequently signed a political contract with the winning team who, once 
elected, asked the Metalworkers to nominate a technical expert to serve on the governor’s staff. 
encourage greater grass-roots participation in electoral politics and the significance of failed 
attempts to do so. 
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